In early 2019, the market stability reserve (MSR), a volume-based regulatory regime for tackling the surplus in emission allowances (EUAs) in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), will enter into force. The MSR will take EUAs out of the market when the amount of banked and thus unused EUAs exceeds an upper threshold and will release EUAs into the market when the amount of banked EUAs falls under a lower threshold. Over the last years, the design of the MSR has been the topic of controversial discussion. Among other concerns, scientists are afraid that the MSR may increase price volatility and uncertainty, which in turn may enhance speculative activity. In this paper we analyze the effect of the MSR on the behavior of a speculator with market power. For this purpose, the interlinked electricity and carbon market is modeled with an open-source agent-based model, which is expanded by adding the banking behavior of the speculator. The results indicate that with the MSR mechanism being active in the EU ETS, both speculative banking activity and speculator profit increase. We further test the hypothesis that the MSR mechanism itself could be used by a speculator to increase his returns, leading to the conclusion that while this is theoretically possible, it is unlikely to actually happen. The results obtained can help to understand future behavior of market participants in the EU ETS. 
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Introduction
The European Union's Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the largest trading scheme for emission allowances worldwide (World Bank, 2012) . The aim of the EU ETS is to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in a cost-efficient manner. In recent years, prices of EU emission allowances (EUAs) have fallen to very low levels (~ 5 €/t CO2). The low prices originate from a mismatch between the fixed supply of EUAs and the elastic demand for them, which is affected by business cycle fluctuations and fuel prices. The mismatch has caused a surplus of EUAs in the market. According to the European Commission, however, the current prices do not fully reflect future scarcity of allowances, when emission reduction goals will be more demanding. Long-term total emission reduction is guaranteed by the lowering of the emission cap over time. The 2016 cap amounts to around 1.97 billion allowances 1 . The cap is reduced linearly by around 38 million allowances each year, which corresponds to 1.74% of the average total quantity of allowances issued in (EC, 2010 . For Phase 4 of the EU ETS it is planned to increase the linear reduction factor to 2.2% per year (EC, 2014c) .
Too low prices have a negative effect on the cost efficiency of the system though, as 2 they do not provide a sufficient incentive for early investment in emission reduction measures (EC, 2014a) .
In order to tackle the surplus of EUAs, the European Union has agreed upon a new mechanism, the so-called "market stability reserve" (MSR). The MSR will enter into force in 2019. It will, with a delay of two years, take EUAs out of the market when the amount of banked and unused allowances exceeds an upper threshold. Likewise, it will release EUAs into the market when the amount of banked allowances falls below a lower threshold (European Commission, 2015a) .
The MSR and its effects on EUA prices have been in the focus of many studies in recent years, and numerous concerns have been expressed. In particular, scientists suggest that the MSR might increase price volatility and price uncertainty. The main reasons for this are reported to be the delay of the MSR response and that the MSR response does jump if one of the triggers is reached (Acworth, 2014) .
EUAs are banked for the purpose of arbitrage, hedging or speculation. Power companies are the main source of hedging demand. They bank EUAs to hedge their future power sales. Speculative banking is mostly done by trading houses from within and outside the EU. Most banks do not hold risk positions in the EU ETS and instead function as intermediary traders for other market participants. Overall, the motivation and strategy of financial speculators in the EU ETS is still largely unknown (BMU, 2014) .
This study aims at investigating the effect of the MSR on the banking behavior of speculators. Because the MSR response has a delay of two years, we focus on long-term speculation only.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we first provide an overview of the existing literature and research projects carried out with regard to the EU ETS and the actors involved in the price-finding process. From the theoretical background the research hypotheses are derived. For our investigation we use the opensource agent-based EMLab-Generation model, which has already been used to model the EU ETS in previous research. We add speculation to the model and modify it to meet the requirements of the research. The model is presented in section 3, and the results are discussed in section 4. Section 5 summarizes the main findings and concludes.
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Theoretical background and research hypotheses 2.1. Hedging and speculative banking
In accordance with the existing literature, we define banking in the context of this study as the holding of EUAs which exceeds the amount needed for compliance in the current year. Actors in the market bank allowances for hedging, speculation or arbitrage purposes. Trading by arbitrageurs, however, does not generate additional banking demand, because their counterparties are usually hedgers (Schopp & Neuhoff, 2013) .
Neuhoff et al. (2012) conduct a series of interviews with stakeholders in the EU ETS and find that agents differentiate clearly between hedging and speculative activities and discount them differently. While hedging, within the risk management criteria of power companies, takes place at low discount rates of 0-10%, speculation only seems profitable when rates exceed 10-15%. So far, big investors such as banks have stated in interviews that they do not have open risk positions in the market, but close their positions in portfolios which combine banked allowances, futures, and options. However, speculative investors might enter the market once the necessary rates of return can be expected.
At the moment hedging is mostly done by power companies, which hedge their future power sales. This accounts for most of the currently banked EUAs. Power producers sell their electricity up to 3-4 years in advance and hedge their production costs.
Schopp & Neuhoff (2013) model speculation and hedging in the carbon market.
They find that when the surplus of allowances exceeds the hedging needs of power companies, speculators enter the market and stabilize prices at lower levels, which then provide the necessary rates of return for speculative investments 2 . This could explain the latest price drops in the EU ETS. Furthermore, the participation of traders outside of the EU can be a hint for speculation in the market. About 10% of the total trading volume (including derivatives) in 2010 was traded by non-EU players (World Bank, 2012) .
Backloading and the MSR
The problem of low allowance prices due to excess EUAs in the market can also be seen as a problem of missing intertemporal arbitrage. Market participants do not sufficiently reflect future scarcity in today's prices. To address this problem, the European Commission has decided on two market reforms, which both work as an alternative banking account. The first one is called backloading. The idea is to reduce the amount of auc-4 tioned allowances in the years 2014, 2015, and 2016 by 400, 300, and 200 million EUAs, respectively. Originally, it was planned to additionally auction these allowances in the years 2019 (+300 million EUAs) and 2020 (+600 million EUAs) (EC, 2012 ) (EC, 2014b . But in 2015 the European Parliament decided that the backloaded allowances will instead be put into the new MSR, in order not to increase the current surplus of allowances in the market any further (EC, 2015a).
The MSR is a regulative mechanism which will start in 2019 to address the problem of surplus EUAs in the EU ETS (Erbach, 2015) . Energy utilities and industrial installations have to send their monitoring reports to the authorities by March 31 of the following year. A number of EUAs equivalent to the amount of emissions generated has to be transmitted from the emitter to the authorities by April 30 (EC, 2016a) . The number of banked EUAs for each year is published on May 15 of the subsequent year. The number of banked EUAs can be calculated as the sum of the allowances allocated in the past minus those used (EC, 2014a) .
When the number of banked EUAs exceeds the upper threshold of 833.33 million EUAs, the mechanism reduces for the following year (i.e. with a two-year delay from the year in which the surplus is observed) the number of EUAs auctioned by an amount equal to 12% of the banked EUAs. In case the number of banked allowances is less than the lower threshold of 400 million allowances, the fixed amount of 100 million allowances is additionally put into the market. The same amount of additional allowances is released in case the price of the EUAs exceeds the average of the past two years by a factor of three (EC, 2014a).
The effect of the MSR on price volatility and price uncertainty
It lies in the nature of quantity-based certificate trading schemes that they bear the risk of price volatility. As Kettner et al. (2011) describe it: "There is a fundamental trade-off between a cap-and-trade scheme's main advantage, the certainty of the emission limit, and the likelihood of price volatility". Price volatility and uncertainty for their part can have a negative impact on abatement investments.
The MSR and its effects on EUA prices have been at the center of many recent studies. Frommeyer et al. (2015) analyze different design options for the MSR and their effect on price stability and uncertainty. They conclude that the jump response by the MSR is conducive to increasing uncertainty in the market, even when the response is not triggered. Richstein et al. (2015) Acworth (2014) conducts a meta-analysis of commentaries and analysis on the MSR mechanism. They find that most investigators have two main concerns. The first one is that the upper trigger might be set too low and interfere with the hedging needs of power producers. Another concern is that the MSR might increase price volatility in the market, caused by the delayed jump response of the mechanism.
Exercise of market power in emissions allowance markets
In the carbon market, two kinds of exercising of market power are possible. The first type concerns only the permit market. A large market participant shows aggressive behavior and influences allowance prices in order to maximize his profit. In distinction to this, market power is also used when market participants take advantage of their market power both in the allowance market and in the electricity market. Market participants then might accept lower profits in one of the markets in order to increase overall profits (Tietenberg, 2006 , Klingenfeld, 2007 . In the EU ETS, the second type has been mostly connected to power producers and the free allocation of allowances. Power companies 6 Emission permits in the EU ETS can be seen as both a commodity and a financial asset. Energy companies, industrial manufacturers and other industries need EUAs as a production input. At the same time, EUAs can be traded for financial purposes only, for speculation, or to diversify an investment portfolio (Bonacina & Cozialpi, 2009 
Research hypotheses
From the theoretical background provided, we derive three hypotheses that we want to test:
Hypothesis 1: The MSR leads to more speculative activity As discussed in section 2.1, speculators require expected price increases of 10-15% per year to enter the market. These steep price increases might happen more often when the MSR becomes active, as volatility is expected to increase (see section 2.3). Therefore, it can be suspected that also speculative activity will be higher in a market with an MSR.
Hypothesis 2: The MSR leads to higher speculator profits
This is closely connected to hypothesis 1. As investment opportunities for speculators increase, profits should follow. Additionally, steep price movements might not only occur more often, but also become even steeper. This should increase the rate of return that speculators can achieve for their investment.
Hypothesis 3: A speculator with market power might actively trigger the MSR response to increase his profits
Another effect on speculators' behavior can come from the jump response of the MSR.
The jump response creates uncertainty in the market, as participants are unsure whether 7 the response will be triggered or not (see section 2.3). Hedgers' and speculators' banking decisions generate an equilibrium between current and expected future prices.
A state of uncertainty regarding the MSR reaction can therefore be interpreted as a state of two parallel market equilibria: one expecting the MSR response to be triggered, and the other one expecting it not to be triggered. We hypothesize that speculators might not only observe this multi-equilibrium state, but actively try to push the market into the equilibrium which grants higher profits to their investments. This of course would only be feasible for a speculator with market power, whereby the case of sufficient market power is not unlikely in the EU ETS (see section 2.4).
In 
Model description and assumptions
For the analysis, we use the agent-based EMLab-Generation model in the version of Richstein et al. (2015) and add a speculator with market power to the model. Additionally, we introduce changes in the banking behavior of power producers and in the pricefinding process of the carbon market. These additions and other modifications are described in some detail in sections 3.4 and 3.5, respectively.
Model description
The EMLab-Generation model was first introduced by de Vries et al. (2013) . Their intention was to create a dynamic simulation model which is suitable to "capture the intertemporal relations […] that affect the long-term development of the electricity sector". Richstein et al. (2015) discuss the merits of agent-based models for energy market mod-eling. They conclude that agent-based models might be better suited to dealing with some characteristics of the energy market than traditional tools, notably the "price formation processes in power markets" and the heterogeneous decision-making process of agents which can be "non-continuous" and "highly non-linear". Also, they might have advantages when modeling power plants, which should be treated as "discrete objects with different underlying technologies and long lifetimes". The model description that follows in sections 3.2 to 3.4 is a summary of more extensive model descriptions provided by Richstein et al. (2014) .
EMLab-Generation is an open-source 3 agent-based model which models the electricity markets of two interconnected market areas within the EU ETS, in particular the market areas Central Western Europe (consisting of Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and The Netherlands) and Great Britain.
The model has a time resolution of one year. In each year, the carbon and electricity markets are cleared. Power producers and speculators decide on the number of EUAs they bank, power producers "bid into the electricity markets, determine the fuel mix of their power plants and buy fuel, make investment decisions, pay for the various expenses, and maintain a bank balance" (Richstein et al., 2015, p. 5) .
Only the spot market is modeled. This approach is similar to the one used by Schopp et al. (2015), where arbitrage is also modeled indirectly. Since the electricity market is the only product market modeled, price elasticity of demand from other industrial sectors in the EU ETS is not accounted for. To compensate for this shortcoming, the EUA price is limited to a maximum of 120 €/t CO2. Beyond this price it is assumed that additional abatement in other sectors would lower allowance prices again (Richstein et al., 2015) .
Our model does not account for international credits which stem from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or from Joint Implementation (JI). The use of international credits in the third phase of the EU ETS (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) (2018) (2019) (2020) is limited by quantitative restrictions, which depend on the emissions which will be emitted in this period (EC, 2013) . Analysts estimate that all sectors together will be entitled to the use of international credits with a value of 1.6 billion t CO2. By the end of 2015 market participants in the EU ETS already made use of 1.45 billion international credits. It is therefore sug-9 gested that in the following years only relatively few international credits will be used in the EU ETS (EC, 2015b).
The European Union plans to abolish the use of international credits in its current form after 2020. Instead, the EU has suggested new rules for linking future carbon markets around the world (Latvian Government & EC, 2015) (EC, 2016b). 
Input data, generation capacity, and technologies
We use the input data provided by Richstein et al. (2015) . Fifteen generation technologies are modeled which are based on the World Energy Outlook 2011 New Policies Scenario (IEA, 2011) and on assumptions formulated in Richstein et al. (2014) . Fuel price paths are derived from the fuel price paths of the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC, 2012 , Richstein et al., 2014 . Data for the initial power plant portfolios are taken from Eurelectric (2012) whereas the average age structure of the different technologies is based on RWE (2008) .
New generation capacity is added to the market by power producers. As a decision criterion for new investments, power companies are assumed to use the net present value (NPV), which is calculated on the basis of the forecasts for future fuel and CO2 prices, power demand, and expected age-based power plant dismantlement (Richstein et al., 2015) . Additionally, investments in renewable generation capacity are made by national target investors. National target investors ensure the compliance with the exogenously determined renewable energy policy targets (Richstein et al., 2014) . 
The electricity market
The electricity market is cleared for a specific year and EUA price. Power plants are dispatched according to the merit order of their spot market bids. Spot market bids are calculated by adding 10% to the marginal generation cost of the plant. In the case of power plants with multiple possible fuel types, energy companies adjust the fuel mix based on the current and previous EUA prices. In a first step, the two electricity markets are cleared while being treated as if they were part of a single market. From the accepted bids of the power plants the interconnector flow can be determined. If the flow exceeds the interconnector capacity, the market is split and the capacity of the interconnector is added to the demand of the market area with a supply surplus, and subtracted from the demand of the market area with a supply deficit. Both market areas are then cleared separately. Different load levels in the electricity market are modeled by dividing the market into twenty segments, which represent the cumulative load duration curve. All segments are cleared separately. The total carbon emissions for a year are calculated by adding up the emissions of all segments (Richstein et al., 2015) .
The carbon market
The emission permit market is scaled to the size of the modeled electricity market area; for a detailed explanation the reader is referred to Appendix A in Richstein et al. (2015) .
The MSR is modeled close to the real mechanism described in section 2.2. Backloading is implemented by changing the number of auctioned EUAs. Since the model is sensitive to large changes of the auction volume in single years, the effect of the backloading is smoothed. This is done by allocating the planned backloading volume of one year over three years (Richstein et al., 2015) .
CO2 emission constraints
In order to make their banking decisions, market participants need to consider the current time step as well as future time steps. To facilitate and shorten the calculation process, agents in the model only consider one future time step as a reference point for the current one. The equilibrium price in the current time step and the expected price for the future time step are the result of the price-finding process. The proportion between the current price and the expected future price -the expected price growth rate -is a result of the price-finding process. It is worth noting that this is in contrast to other approaches, where the expected price growth rate is predetermined, for example by Richstein et al. (2015) or Schopp & Neuhoff (2013) .
In each time step the amount of allowances auctioned has to be equal to the amount of allowances used plus the amount of allowances banked. The clearing emission constraint for the current time step t is described by eq. (1):
where Ct is the current emission cap. MSRt is the inflow to the market stability reserve, which depends on the total amount of banked allowances two years before, Bt-2.
Et is the amount of CO2 emissions produced by the electricity market, which are negatively connected with the allowance price. The allowances bought and banked by speculators and hedgers during this time step are labeled bs,t and bh,t, respectively.
In our model all agents share the same expectations about the development of the market. Therefore, only one clearing emission constraint for the future market exists (eq. (2)). In the future time step, speculators are expected to sell their banked allowances. These consist of the allowances they banked in time t and the allowances they had already banked before (eq. (3)):
Hedgers are expected to sell the allowances they banked in a speculative manner which deviates from their hedging target in t (eq. (4)):
Hedging performance optimization
Power companies bank allowances in order to hedge their future power sales. Hedging is reported to take place at a discount rate of 5%, and hedgers might deviate from their hedging targets when the expected price increase is higher or lower than this ( vary from the market development by at least 1-4 €/t CO2 (Schopp & Neuhoff, 2013) . In the model presented, the fine factor is set to 1E-6, which increases the banking goal by 10%, if pt+2 is 4 €/t CO2 higher than pt*(1+ih) (for a difference from the banking target of ∆Th,t = 2 Mt of CO2):
Equation (5) is differentiated with respect to the banking volume in order to derive the optimal banking volume in eq. (7). The optimal banking volume is divided by the revision speed factor r of the hedging entities (we model with r=3):
With respect to eq. (4) we define the first part of eq. (7) as the banking by hedgers in a speculative manner, whereas the second part reflects hedging in its traditional meaning:
Speculator profit optimization
The speculator in the model has unlimited capital funds and market power. We follow the argumentation of Malik (2002) Equation (10) represents the target function of the speculator:
where the first part represents the money earned by selling the EUAs the speculator has banked in the future time step. The second part represents the money paid for the EUAs in the current time step, which is capitalized with the speculator's interest rate is.
The speculator's interest rate is defined as the percentage price increase at which the speculator is indifferent regarding the options to bank and not to bank, respectively. (in our analysis, is is set to 10% 4 ). The speculator affects the market with the amount of emission permits he banks, and approximates the prices as linear functions (eqs. (11) and (12)), starting from the equilibrium prices without speculative trading in the current time step, pt,0 and pt+2,0:
The derivatives , and +2 , are derived from the emission constraints (1) and (2). The behavior of the electricity market is approximated to the linear function
With his knowledge of the banking behavior of the power producers, and an approximate knowledge of the electricity market, the speculator is in a position to optimize his profits by taking advantage of the low elasticity of demand of the former (similarly to the speculator defined in Pirrong, 2007).
The optimal banking amount of the hedgers can be described as a function of the carbon prices and the current and future emissions. 
Similar to the hedgers' case, the derivative is formed and solved for the optimal banking 
The speculator and the MSR
As suggested earlier, one of the aims of our study is to investigate whether the speculator might aim to trigger the MSR response in order to optimize his profit. The speculator could do so by banking more allowances, thereby increasing the EUA price. As discussed in section 2.5 and modeled in section 3.3, increased prices force CO2 abatement in the electricity market, as power producers change the fuel mix and the dispatch plan of their power plants. 
At the beginning of each year, the speculator is assumed to know the number of currently banked EUAs 5 . The speculator can approximate the banking amount needed to trigger the MSR with eq. (18).
The clearing algorithm
The combined carbon and electricity market is cleared in an iterative process. The current and the expected future price are tested in the emission-clearing constraints (1) and (2). If the emissions do not comply with the constraints, the prices are adjusted accordingly. The banking behavior of the hedgers and the speculator are updated for the new prices. In every year that has a future reference year with an active MSR, the speculator calculates the banking amount which would be needed to trigger the MSR. If the banking amount resulting from the optimization without MSR (eq. (16)) is lower than the banking amount needed for triggering, the target function values are checked. The speculator then banks the amount of allowances which corresponds to the higher target function value. Once the constraints are fulfilled, the markets are considered to be cleared.
In some rare cases, the iterative process cannot find an equilibrium solution within the given number of maximum iterations. In order to still fulfill the market equation for the current year, agents have to deviate from their optimal banking plans. In these cases, we put speculator interests before hedger interests, since the behavior of the speculator is at the core of our investigation.
Results and interpretation
Scenario description
We model three policy scenarios. The scenario Backloading is the same as that presented by Richstein et al. (2015) . In this scenario, only the backloading mechanism is active. The mechanism reduces the amount of auctioned allowances in 2014, 2015, and 2016 and adds these allowances to the emission caps in 2019 and 2020 (EC, 2012; EC, 2014b) . As mentioned in section 3.4, the effect is smoothed and spread out over several years. Based on the Backloading scenario, the BBA_MSR (BBA short for "banked backloaded allowances") scenario adds the MSR to the model, as was decided by the European Union (EC, 2015) . This means that the allowances which would have been additionally auctioned in 2019 and 2020 are instead put into the reserve. In order to make the interpretation of the results easier, a third scenario -in which the MSR is introduced but the backloading schedule is not affected -is added, referred to as the PureMSR scenario.
In section 4.5 we additionally present results for two different assumptions about the hedging targets of power producers, both are based on Eurelectric (2009) The model is run as a Monte Carlo simulation. Richstein et al. (2014) derive 120 fuel price pathsfrom the fuel price data mentioned in section 3.2, which are also used in Richstein et al. (2015) . We model each policy scenario for these 120 fuel price paths.
Price analysis
Our hypothesis about increased speculative activity is based on the assumption of steeper price increases and higher price volatility with the MSR mechanism being active.
Because of the changes that were made to the model, it is necessary to reflect on this assumption again. Figure 3 (a)-(c) shows the EUA prices for the three policy scenarios.
As noticed by Richstein et al. (2015) , the input data used likely overestimate the impact of the nuclear phase-out in Germany on emission allowance prices. This impact is especially strong in the years 2020 to 2025, and explains part of the steep price increase for these years which can be observed for each of the policy scenarios. Figure 4 shows the speculator's banking activity for the three policy scenarios. As expected, activity is strongest in the early years of the modeled period. Market participants notice the upcoming MSR activity from 2017 on. Until then, speculator banking is the same for the Backloading and the PureMSR scenario.
Speculator banking
The allowances additionally auctioned through the backloading mechanism let market participants in the PureMSR scenario to ignore the upcoming scarcity. As a consequence, they start to bank later than in the scenario where the allowances are put into the MSR.
Because the median conceals speculator activity in the later years, two parameters are introduced to further investigate the speculator's behavior. The first one is the temporal integral over the bank account (for allowances) of the speculator. This is a measurement of how many allowances the speculator takes out of the market. The second one is the average time that the speculator holds allowances for before selling them. It is calculated as the quotient of the integral over the bank account divided by the total amount of bought allowances in the model period.
Results can be seen in Table 1 For the years 2030 to 2050, the median of the banking amount in the PureMSR scenario is still around 10% higher than in the Backloading scenario. In the PureMSR scenario, the speculator does not hold allowances for more than one year. This could be caused by the absence of multi-period price growth trends. The small amount of banked certificates in the years 2030 to 2050 is probably caused by the underestimation of the price growth rate in these years.
The banked allowances and the average years that a speculator holds the asset for are calculated separately for each fuel price path; the same fuel price paths are compared pairwise for the different policy options. The comparison of the PureMSR with the Backloading scenario can be seen in Table 2 . In the PureMSR scenario, the speculator banks more allowances in 72.5% of all scenarios and on average 12.13% more than in the Backloading scenario. For the BBA_MSR scenario banking increases on average by 33.23%. The value is higher than the value for the PureMSR scenario, even though the absolute difference is larger for the PureMSR scenario. This can be explained by the circumstance that the 22 banking activity in the BBA_MSR scenario is out of alignment with the banking in the Backloading scenario for the years 2017 to 2019. 
Speculator profit
As an indicator for the speculator's profit we calculated the net present value of the cash flow generated by his activity in the market. The speculator's profit increases from in average €349 million in the Backloading scenario to €459 million in the PureMSR scenario. The increase of the speculator's profit for the MSR scenarios is disproportionately high compared to the increase in banking activity. This indicates that the speculator in these scenarios on average receives a higher rate of return on his investments.
The average profit in the BBA_MSR scenario of €341 million is comparatively small.
The release of the backloaded allowances into the market can hereby be determined as a key driver for the speculator's profit. The release of the backloaded allowances lets prices fall in the years 2017 to 2020 and thereby grants higher price growth rates during the subsequent years.
As in the analysis of the speculator banking, the scenarios are compared pairwise and the absolute and percentage differences in the net present values of the two scenarios are analyzed. Table 4 presents the changes in the net present value for a speculator in a market with the MSR as compared to the Backloading scenario. The median increase in profit for the PureMSR scenario is 11.29% as compared to the Backloading scenario, while for the BBA_MSR scenario results show a median decrease of 4.19%. In the right column of Table 5 the calculated numbers are presented in which the speculator did not only adjust his banking, but where his banking was essential for triggering the MSR response. This is assessed by comparing the total amount of banked allowances by energy producers to the upper trigger of the MSR once the equilibrium is reached. If the banked allowances by the power producers do not reach the upper trigger, the banking by the speculator must have been essentially necessary.
Speculator impact on the MSR response
Two possible explanations can be identified for the large difference between the numbers in the right and the left column. The first one is that the speculator might overestimate the elasticity of demand of the energy sector. This may happen because the speculator approximates the electricity market by a linear function. He then might assume that, with lower prices, emissions would increase rapidly and use up so many of the banked allowances of the power producers that the MSR trigger is not reached any more.
The other explanation for the difference in numbers would be that the banking behavior of the speculator was indeed significant at some point of the iterative search for the equilibrium price, but might not be significant once the equilibrium is reached.
Power producers increase their banking volumes if they expect the MSR to bank in the future reference year, in order to prepare for the upcoming scarcity in the market. This chain reaction might be so strong that in the new market equilibrium, power producers bank enough to trigger the MSR by themselves. In this scenario, the speculator would have shifted the market from the one equilibrium into the other. The way the model is set up, it seems difficult (and beyond the scope of this study) to separate the two possible cases discussed above. With the criterion defined, we only find eight occurrences where the speculator's banking is critical to triggering the MSR.
These eight occurrences happen within six fuel price paths (two of the six scenarios have two occurrences each). In all of the six scenarios, the banking activity of interest is part of a series of banking activities in the years directly before or after the occurrence, which makes it hard to directly define the return on the banking investment. We calculate the discounted cash flow of the series of investments around the occurrence and take this as a proxy for the profitability of the single investment. The result is that in two thirds of the fuel price paths, the discounted cash flow is positive. Therefore, the speculator has no possibility to cash in on his information advantage, and instead has to buy allowances at the higher equilibrium price.
In sum, the approach adopted in this paper was to model a speculator who uses his market power in order to take advantage of the temporary inelastic demand of the electricity market and hedging power companies for emission allowances. The MSR response increases the return of the speculator when it puts the market into a condition where hedgers are no longer willing to bank further certificates at interest rates below the interest rate of the speculator. Our results indicate that this will not happen with high frequency.
Conclusion
In this paper we used an agent-based model of two interlinked electricity market areas within the EU ETS to investigate the effect of the MSR on the behavior of a speculator with market power. The model is based on strong assumptions regarding the market insight of the speculator and a direct link without delay between CO2 emissions and the emission allowance price. The model focuses on long-term speculation; the time resolution of the model is one year.
Our findings support the hypotheses that the MSR increases speculative activity and speculator profit. We find that it is profitable for the speculator to invest when hedging power companies require higher price increases rather than to bank further EUAs. The implementation of the MSR will likely increase the number of years in which these investment opportunities occur. As a consequence, we find an increase in speculative banking. The effect is especially strong in the early years of the MSR and significantly weaker in the later years. We also find that the speculator's profit rises under the MSR regime. The increase in profit is disproportionately high in comparison to the banking volume of the speculator, which leads to the conclusion that the rate of return on the speculator's investments rises as well.
In the model presented, the speculator is assumed to have market power. If one were to deviate from this assumption, results would be different. Notice that in the absence of 27 market power the increase in banking volumes would be even higher. This is because in the applied model, the speculator achieves the perfect equilibrium between his banking volume and the rate of return. In a market with perfect competition, speculators would bank until the expected growth rate only offers the minimal needed risk premium and therefore would bank more. Vice versa, the rate of return would not increase to the same extent in the case of perfect competition.
We also test the hypothesis that a speculator with market power may increase his profits by banking additional allowances to trigger the upper trigger of the MSR. In the case of rising EUA prices, the response of the MSR further increases the difference between today's and future prices. When the growth rate of prices then exceeds the interest rate of the speculator, the speculator can increase his profits by triggering the MSR response. While the results obtained support the hypothesis that this is theoretically possible, the necessary market conditions seem unlikely to occur.
However, not all ways by which a speculator could profit from the MSR mechanism are modeled in our analysis. The model used does not capture the information advantage that a speculator who is going to manipulate the market has in comparison to other mar- 
Appendix: Calculation of the price gradients
The rates at which the current and the future price change with a change in the banked EUAs by the speculator can be derived from the two emission-clearing constraints. In a first step, the price elasticity of demand of the electricity market is approximated by expressing the emissions as a linear function: (A.14)
The constants k1 to k4 are: is calculated using eq.
(A.13)).
Note that we do not reflect the MSR in the calculation of the price gradients. The MSR, once triggered, banks a percentage of the allowances banked in the market. This means that also a percentage of the banked allowances by the speculator would go into the reserve. Theoretically, this would lower the effect that banking by the speculator has on the expected future spot price. We assume this effect to be negligible after accounting for the elasticity of the hedgers' banking.
